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From the middle of the 19th century onwards two fundamental, contrasting 
foreign policy doctrines developed in Russia; first Pan-Slavism promoting 
expansionism in Europe, then later Eurasian imperialism with a forceful Asian 
mission. The events of the 1880’s changed European Russian foreign policy 
to concentrating on straits to the sea on the one hand and becoming friendly 
towards the Serbs on the other.1 The defeat suffered at the hands of the Japanese 
in 1904–1905 lead to internal crisis and revolution in Russian, which Tsar 
Nicholas II and his circle attempted to handle with a degree of liberalization, 
a particular quasi parliament and the institution of the Duma. These policies 
reduced the brutal Russian governmental nationalist oppression introduced 
during the rule of Alexander III and gave the nationalities living within the 
territory of the empire and Russian society itself room to breathe.
The particularity of the state with Saint Petersburg at its center was 
that Russians were not in the majority.2 Since the division of Poland in the 
1 After the Bulgarians, the Russians began to strongly support the Serbians as well. According 
to the older, orthodox based Russian expansionist concept both the Bulgarian and the Serbian 
nation counted equally as “brothers”. For more details on this process see: G. GECSE, A 
külpolitika hatása az 1870-es, 1880-as évek orosz nagyhatalmi gondolkodására, in: Nemzetek 
és birodalmak. Diószegi István 80 éves, Budapest 2010, pp. 177–191.
2 Based on the 1897 census Russians comprised 44.2% of the Russian Empire although if taken 
together with the Ukrainians they could be considered a majority (62%). See M. HELLER – 
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18th century there was constant friction with the largest Slavic nationality not 
sharing a religious denomination with the Russians: the Poles. In examining 
the chief element of the various Russian Pan-Slavic concepts resting primarily 
on an ethnocentric based foundation, it may be ascertained that following the 
dismantling of the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire the Russians 
did not wish to annex these territories to Russian directly but instead envisioned 
a federation of states over which Russia would have “only” supremacy.3 
Following the 1905 Revolution from the outset of the institution of the Duma, 
Russians received greater representation in proportion to their percentage of 
the population. Consequently, from 1906 onwards, along with their greater 
representation in the Duma they also had greater influence there than the other 
nationalities.
For Saint Petersburg the greatest dilemma up until the outbreak of the 
First World War was caused by the Poles,4 who formed a separate fraction in 
the Russian Duma. Acknowledging the indefensibility of the old Pan-Slavic 
position with regard to the Poles, the Russian movement promulgating the 
union of all Slavs redefined itself as Neoslav. Three Neoslav congresses 
were held in total: in Prague in 1908, in Sofia in 1910 and in Belgrade in 
1911.5 Whereas absent at the earlier 1867 Moscow Slavic Congress, Polish 
were now attendees to the 1908 Prague Congress. Their leader in the Duma, 
Roman Dmowski opposed German expansion and, similarly to the Czech 
A. NYEKRICS, Orosz történelem 2. kötet. A Szovjetunió története, Budapest 1996, p. 55; G. 
HOSKING, Rossia i russkie, Vol. 1, Moscow 2003, p. 423.
3 See for example the concepts outlined by Danilevsky, Fadeyev and Leontiev. G. GECSE, 
Bizánctól Bizáncig. Az orosz birodalmi gondolat, Budapest 2007, pp. 107, 115, 164.
4 The Polish-Russian congress taking place in Moscow in April of 1905 took the position 
of autonomy, but even more significant was the Pan-Russian zemstvo congress held in 
September, which took a similar position. According to the Tsar’s May Decree the Polish 
language was introduced in primary schools in Polish territory and the establishment of Polish 
private middle schools was also permitted. K. RÁTZ, A pánszlávizmus története, Budapest 
2000, reissue of the 1941 Volume, pp. 227–228.
5 Neoslavism is considered a Czech creation and is attributed to the Czech Karel Kramář was at 
that time orientating towards Russia rather than towards Austria. See A. Ya. AVREH, Tsarism 
i tretyeijunskaya sistema, Moscow 1966, p. 91.
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Karel Kramář active in the Parliament in Vienna, emphasized the necessity 
for Austria-Hungary and Russia to unite. This state of affairs was greatly 
exacerbated by the formal annexation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina by the 
Monarchy.6
Shortly thereafter two wars were waged in the Balkan Peninsula. The first 
Russia considered to be a foreign policy success, as the Balkan block which 
was the foundation for outbreak of the war on October 13, 1912 had been 
formed with Russia’s support.7 The division of the booty (mainly Macedonia), 
however, lead to a serious dispute between Serbia and Bulgaria, which in turn 
lead to the attack by Bulgaria on Serbia on June 27, 1913.
The Serbians, however, had by then entered an alliance against Bulgaria 
not only with the non-Slavic Romanians, but also with the “ancient enemy”: 
the Turks.8 As a result of the Bucharest Peace Treaty of August 10, 1913 
Serbia and Greece remained Entente orientated while Bulgaria did not. The 
relationship between the Russian leadership and the Czech parties on the other 
hand, further solidified in the wake of the wars in the Balkans.9
6 On September 16 of 1908 Russia gave its assent to the annexation provided that the 
Monarchy supported permitting the passage of the Russian military navy through the straights 
to the sea. Count Alexander Izvolsky was in Paris to negotiate the deal, however, when Vienna 
announced the annexation and thus the Russian Foreign Minister learned about the event 
from the newspapers. See I. MAJOROS – M. ORMOS, Európa a nemzetközi küzdőtéren. 
Felemelkedés és hanyatlás 1814–1945, Budapest 1998, p. 199. A peculiar contradiction at 
the time was that the Slavic representatives in the Parliament of the Habsburg Monarchy, the 
majority of whom sympathized with the Russians (such as the Czechs and the Southern Slavs), 
voted by a great majority for the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the Hungarians 
(and, of course for other reasons, the Serbs) were not at all enthusiastic about the action.
7 On March 13 of 1912 the Serbians and the Bulgarians entered into alliance, which was 
followed by an alliance between the Serbians and the Greeks to which Montenegro soon joined. 
In December of 1912 the war ending in Turkish defeat was ended with a peace concluded in 
May of 1913, which also established Albania’s independence. E. PALOTÁS, Kelet-Európa 
története a XX. század első felében, Budapest 2003, p. 66.
8 The Bulgarians had succeeded in retaining only the Thracian seaside and the Struma River 
Valley amongst the territories gained in the previous war: essentially a tenth of Macedonia. The 
Turks regained Adrianople, while the Romanians Southern Dobrudja. See PALOTÁS, p. 68.
9 In 1913 Václav Klofáč, the head of the Czech National Socialist Party offered the Party’s 
assistance to the Russian secret service. I. MAJOROS, Vereségtől a győzelemig. Franciaország 
a nemzetközi kapcsolatok rendszerében (1871–1920), Budapest 2004, p. 218.
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Sergei Sazonov, appointed Russia’s minister of foreign affairs in 1910,10 
attempted unsuccessfully to persuade the Balkan states and the Porte to enter 
an alliance against Austria-Hungary.11 Following the assassination in Sarajevo 
in June 1914 the radicals of the Russian rightwing were not enthusiastic 
about a clash with the Germans, while (primarily) the liberals succeeded 
in persuading the greater part of Russian society, including Nicholas II 
himself, to support the war. It was the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy which, 
on July 28 of 1914, triggered the First World War by declaring war on Serbia. 
Nevertheless amongst the Great Powers only Russia, in an anti-German 
position represented by Sergei Sazonov,12 made no secret of the fact that she 
aimed to destroy the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,13 even though in Russia’s 
peace treaty draft Sazonov outlined a trialist Habsburg Monarchy comprised 
of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.14 Russia, with her allies Great Britain 
and France, succeeded on the March of 1915 in officially having endorsed the 
so-called Constantinople Agreement, according to which, in the event of an 
Entente victory she would have gained Constantinople, the western coast of 
the Bosporus, the Dardanelles and a strip of Southern Thracia.15
Paradoxically the Russians did not take substantive steps prior to 
the First World War in the interest of realizing their claims with regard to 
Constantinople, for they were waiting for a victorious end to the war to bear 
10 Sergei Dmitriyevich Sazonov held this post until June 1916.
11 Sazonov belonged to the pro-war faction within the Saint Petersburg government. 
See F. FEJTŐ, Rekviem egy hajdanvolt birodalomért. Ausztria-Magyarország 
szétrombolása, Budapest 1997, pp. 46–47.
12 The most certain method of hitting Germany with a blow and preventing her ambitions 
to world power is to destroy the toppling building of the Habsburg Monarchy. Sz. D. 
SZAZÓNOV, Végzetes évek, n.d., p. 314.
13 The Russians in September and November of 1914 signaled to their French allies that they 
wish to procure a reinforced naval base on the Bosporus and in Thracia, as well as to destroy 
Austria-Hungary. FEJTŐ, p. 49.
14 Nevertheless in talks with the French ambassador in Saint Petersburg several months later 
Sazonov again stressed that “Austria-Hungary must be dismembered.” January 1, 1915. 
MAJOROS, p. 216.
15 H. KOHN, Pan-Slavism. Its History and Ideology, New York 1960, pp. 257–258. For more 
details on the Constantinople Agreement see: SZAZÓNOV, pp. 358–362.
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fruit. 16 The course of the war was taking however, did not look as their hopes 
would be realized. Between 1916 and 1917 it was not Russia, but instead 
the Central Powers which succeeding in bringing the intermediary European 
territories, the co-called Zwischeneuropa,17 under their control. As far as the 
parties in the Duma were concerned, in August 1915 the Kadets, along with the 
Octobrists, the Centrists and the moderate right wing formed the Progressive 
Block in opposition to the Tsar’s policies, to which the Tsar responded by 
breaking up the session of the Duma.
Although the major offensive lead by General Brusilov in the summer of 
1916 was successful, it came with massive losses.18 The crippling of Russia by 
the war strengthened the circle in the Tsar’s court supporting the conclusion 
of a separate peace with Germany. This also explains the dismissal of the 
Entente friendly Sazonov in the summer, but the announcement by the Central 
Powers of the formation of an independent Poland in the November of 1916 
exacerbated the Russian government’s situation. When Nicholas II convened 
the Duma session for the first of November it turned out that the great majority 
of Russia’s political players, in spite of the depletion of the country’s human and 
16 The Russians did not develop their Black Sea navy significantly in comparison to the navy 
in the Baltics. In addition they had planned to expend only a fraction of the amount designated 
for the development of the Black Sea navy in 1914 (25 million rubles from the total allotment 
of 112 million rubles for the period between 1914 and 1917). This was the subject of the 
February 21, 1914 special session. See Yu. B. LUNIEVA, Bosphor i Dardanelli. Tayniye 
provokatsii nakanune Pervoj mirovoj vojni (1907–1914), Moscow 2010, pp. 203–210, 243.
17 It was primarily between the two World Wars that the territory between Russian and 
Germany was called Zwischeneuropa, a term first used by German scholars in 1916. Cited by 
I. ROMSICS, Nemzet, nemzetiség, állam Kelet-Közép- és Délkelet- Európában a 19. és 20. 
Században, Budapest 1998, p. 18.
18 The figures on the death toll in the intense three month battle are contradictory. According 
to British sources the German death toll reached 1 million whereas Austria-Hungarian and 
Russian sources put this number close to 350,000. http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/
battles_kovel_stanislav.html. In an earlier work Nelipovich however, reports that the Russian 
losses were far greater at 1,650,000 See: http://www.pereplet.ru/history/Author/Russ/N/
Nelipov/Articles/brusil.html#п3, as well as his newer book published in 2006 in which the 
number of Russian losses is stated to be 1,446,334. S. G. NELIPOVICH, Brusilovskii proriv, 
Moscow 2006, p. 45. In spite of their success the Russians were unable to complete their 
victory. See N. I. TSIMBAYEV, Istoria Rossii XIX – nachala XX vv., Moscow 2004, pp. 
397–399.
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physical resources, continue to support carrying on the war for an anticipated 
final victory. Prime Minister Stürmer was charged with being a German 
stooge, who thwarted the intention by the Tsar to conclude a separate peace. 
In December of 1916 the assassination of Rasputin, who had maintained great 
influence over Empress Alexandra, succeeding in convincing those who had 
been up to then in doubt that the state of the court was untenable.19 Following 
these events the outbreak of the 1917 February Revolution contributed to 
the fulfillment of destiny and the Tsar, with little opposition, relinquished 
power.  The Liberals, the Octobrists and the Social Revolutionaries forming 
a government in Russia in March of 1917 ensured autonomy to the Poles,20 
and ratified the Finnish Constitution. According to the Lvov government’s 
position, from the Russian standpoint after the overthrow of Tsarism and the 
victory of the revolution the war had lost its imperial character and had now 
become a revolutionary fight for national defense. The attempt, therefore, to 
mobilize the population in the interest of a victorious end to the war continued. 
During the course of the revolution, however, a number of soviets, i.e. councils, 
had been formed alongside of the Provisional Government across the country 
and in the capital city as well, resulting in the emergence of a dual authority over 
the country. In contrast to the government the soviets, were not pro-war. The 
Petersburg City Council, the Petrograd Soviet gave voice most fervently to the 
mood of the masses, which resulted in a number of disputes with the Provisional 
Government. The anti-war mood became so great that on April 26, 1917 Foreign 
Minister Pavel Milyukov, having supported the fight to a final victory, gave in to 
the pressure of the mass demonstrations and resigned from his post in early May 
1917, along with Minister of War Alexander Guchkov. The one single person 
19 The most vocal of these was the liberal Constitutional Democratic Party which demanded 
that Russia be capable of maintaining her international position as a strong nation. See 
HELLER – NYEKRICS, p. 12, as well as TSIMBAYEV, pp. 406–407.
20 Whereas the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers’ Deputies recognized the right of 
the Poles to independence, the Provisional Government in its proclamation to the people 
of Poland on March the 16th, 1917 mentions only a “Polish state unified with Russian in a 
free military alliance”, i.e. it offered less to the Poles than did the Central Powers. See I. 
DOLMÁNYOS, A nagy forradalom krónikája, Budapest 1967, pp. 102–103.
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who had consistently proclaimed a program of an immediate peace was 
Vladimir Illich Lenin, who had returned to Petersburg from exile in April of 
1917. His program which he had outlined in 1914 remained the same: the goal 
being “to transform the imperialist war into civil war”.21 Lenin formulated 
the “all power to the Soviets” motto as well, which suggested the non-violent 
overthrow of the Provisional Government.
Following the Petersburg demonstrations Georgy Lvov attempted to 
stabilize the Provisional Government by forming a socialist coalition with the 
cooperation of the Social Revolutionaries. When he felt that this succeeded, 
he wished to support his endeavors with a foreign policy success. In this he 
found a fitting partner in Minister of War and the Navy Alexander Kerensky 
who, in June of 1917, directed General Brusilov to mount a new offensive.22 
This action, however, resulted in an ignominious defeat leading to the fall of 
the Lvov government and then to the formation of a single party government 
by the Social Revolutionaries,23 the head of which was Alexander Kerensky, 
who retained his post as Minister of War.24
After March of 1917 not one of the Russian civil coalition governments 
was willing to resign from representing “Russian national interests”. The ever 
growing military exhaustion played a decisive role in the Bolsheviks (who 
had consistently agitated against the war and had declared national interest 
to be a fabrication) seizing power in November of 1917. Following the 
proclamation of the peace treaty the Russian communists expressed their anti-
imperial policy also in making public secret agreements of earlier Russian 
21 The RSDWP proclamation published in Switzerland on the first of November in 1914 was 
entitled “The war and Social Democracy”. From the motto “to transform the imperialist war 
into civil war” came directly another motto: the defeat of one’s own governments in the 
imperialist war. See A Kommunista Internacionálé, Budapest 1971, pp. 26–27.
22 According to the old Russian calendar this was waged from June 18, 1917 to July 1, 1917. 
The Gregorian calendar notes the beginning of the offensive to be July 1.
23 More than half of the 300,000 soldiers remained dead on the battlefield. The outcry in the 
capital was so great that the Government was forced to resign. LENGYEL, pp. 18–19. Other 
works on this topic state the death toll to be around 60,000 on the Russian side, but certain 
lists state this number to be 400,000. See http://hu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerenszkij-offenzíva.
24 I. DOLMÁNYOS, A Szovjetunió története II. (1917–1966), Budapest 1982, pp. 33–34, 42.
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governments: thus the Anglo-Russian agreement concluded in the spring of 
1915 on the distribution of the territory of the Ottoman Empire, according to 
which Russia would have received Constantinople and the straights to the sea.
In December of 1917 the Bolsheviks concluded an armistice with the 
Central Powers following which they initiated peace negotiations. On their part 
Leon Trotsky representing the position of “neither war, nor peace” ending up 
signing nothing.25 A few weeks later, with less favorable conditions, the Bolsheviks 
concluded the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany on March the 3rd, 1918, 
according to which the Russians surrendered not only the Baltic region, but also 
vast Slavic territories, consequently major parts of Poland and Ukraine as well.26
Following the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty the Entente treated 
Soviet-Russia as an enemy. This may be explained by the fact that Romania occupied 
Bessarabia with no opposition, likewise the British the Caucasian territories, and in 
December of 1918 France took over Odessa.27 On September 20, 1918 the Ottoman 
Empire occupied Baku, to which the Soviet of People’s Commissars reacted by 
declaring this act to be a breach by Istanbul of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and therefore 
the treaty void. As soon as the German Empire as the defeated party put down its 
arms on November 11, 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee repealed 
the Brest-Litovsk Treaty in one decree on November 13, 1918.28
25 The Bolsheviks received 24% of the vote in the elections which took place in December 
1917, while the Social Revolutionaries received 40.4%. N. DAVIES, Európa története, 
Budapest 2002, p. 861; HELLER – NYEKRICS, p. 32. Werth gives these percentages in real 
numbers. N. VERT, Istoria sovietskogo gosudarstva 1900–1991, Moscow 1994, p. 122.
26 József Galántai summarizes the territorial losses of the Russian Empire under the terms 
of Brest-Litovsk as follows: with the recognition of the independence of the Polish, the 
Ukrainian, the Georgian and the Armenian territories in total 60 million people and 1.42 
million square kilometers of land in addition to the loss of 75% of Russia’s iron and steel 
industry. I. NÉMETH (Ed.), XX. századi egyetemes történet, 1.kötet, Budapest 2006, p. 31.
27 Only 3 military divisions were available (compared to the originally planned 12), and 
from these one was incapacitated as the soldiers had been hit with an epidemic. The first 
divisions of the French troops arrived on December 18, 1918 to Odessa and its environs. J. 
K. MUNHOLLAND, The French Army and Intervention in Southern Russia 1918–1919, in: 
Cahiers du Monde russe et sovietique, Vol. XXII, No. 1, 1981, pp. 45–47.
28 The course of the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations is detailed in Yu. Ya. TERESCHENKO, 
Istoria Rossii XX-nachala XXI vv., Moscow 2004, pp. 60–61.
wbhr 02|2014
135
Preceding their withdrawal the Germans had transferred power of the 
occupied territories to the local national councils which had formed in the 
interim. The battles between the civil and the left wing forces thus began in 
these territories, and the left wing was universally supported by Moscow. 
Thus in November 1918 the Council of People’s Commissars recognized the 
independence of the Soviet Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and 
consequently the year of 1919 in these republics was one full of battle between 
the supporters of civil independence and those of the Bolsheviks. Following the 
capitulation by the Germans, Poland under the leadership of Józef Piłsudski, 
however, became a major dilemma for Moscow as on November the 14th in 
1918 Piłsudski and his supporters launched an attack on the Bolsheviks.
Russia and the Versailles Peace Conference
Between November of 1917 and the autumn of 1918 battles broke out 
between the Bolsheviks and their rivals in the central Russian territories. 
Kerensky was the last Russian head of government recognized by the 
Entente who, however, following a few clashes at the end of 1917 with a few 
formations loyal to him, could consider himself lucky to be able to escape 
the country with his skin intact. By 1918 two Russian anti-revolutionary 
centers of power with significant military force had formed in the territory 
of the Empire: one was from the Urals to the east where Alexander Kolchak 
had been first the minister of war for the Russian government which had 
been set up there before he took power at the end of the year; the other was 
the Volunteer Army active in the southern territories of the Russian Empire, 
first under the command of Kornilov, then by the autumn of 1918 under 
Anton Denikin. Both considered themselves to be heirs of Imperial Russia 
and attacked the Bolsheviks as Great Russian nationalists. The members of 
the Russian Constituent Assembly, who had become representatives of the 
legislative assembly on January of 1918 via the only legitimate elections 
held in Russia, met in Archangelsk in the eastern part of Russia, although 
they lacked any real military support.
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Although by November 1918 the Entente had won the First World War 
essentially without Russia, it was undeniable that up until 1917 Russia had 
contributed significantly to victory on the Eastern Front. The Bolsheviks, 
proclaiming a position of peace without annexation and reparations as well 
as the sovereign rights of nations were closer to the position taken by the 
American President Wilson, while at the same time they were declaring an 
all-out war on the capitalist world order as well.29
Incidentally at the end of 1919 the victorious allies were not convinced 
that Bolshevism would not spread further into Europe, even perhaps into 
their own countries. It was, therefore, a major achievement under these 
circumstances that the former Foreign Minister of the Russian Empire, Sergei 
Sazonov was able to obtain the backing of the Leader of the southern Russian 
white Volunteer Army, Anton Denikin and also that of Admiral Alexander 
Kolchak (who had proclaimed himself commander-in-chief) for him to 
represent “the interests of the true Russia” at the Versailles Peace Conference. 
Sazonov was aided in great measure by Karel Kramář, also in Paris (officially 
representing Czechoslovakia) and who viewed Russia to be of key significance 
both from the point of view of Czechoslovakia and of the world order as well 
and considered the Bolsheviks to be so pernicious that he would have been 
willing to send the Czech legions into battle against them.30
In the fall of 1918 Sazonov formed the Russian Policy Advisory Council 
(RPS31) in Paris, whose tasks included outlining extensive preparatory 
documents for the peace process.32 The select cabinet of the RPS, the so-called 
29 Wilson did not encourage the Allied Powers to bring in nations into the negotiations who 
had made a separate peace with Germany, and the agents of which were attempting to topple 
their governments. H. KISSINGER, Diplomácia, Budapest 1996, p. 255.
30 Kramář saw a quasi foreign policy guarantee to Czechoslovakia’s existence in the Russians. 
Ye. P. SERAPIONOVA, Karel Kramarzh i Rossiya, Moscow 2006, p. 281, Masaryk and 
Benes did not support Kramář’s idea to intervene in Russia’s internal affairs as they thought 
that Bolshevism would sooner or later fall automatically. Ibidem, p. 283.
31 Rossiyskoe Politicheskoe Soveschanie.
32 Not only diplomats and politicians, but also generals who had been in command in World 
War I participated in the work which included drafting decisions related to border designations.
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Russian Political Delegation (RPD33) was soon set up, the task of which was 
to take part in the peace negotiations. The Council was composed of three 
members: in addition to Sazonov was Vasily Maklakov, the former ambassador 
to Paris of the Provisional Government and Nicolai Chaykovsky, the president 
of the Provisional Government set up in the eastern Russian territory. (Boris 
Savinkov was to join only later). Former Prime Minister and Interior Minister 
of the Provisional Government, Prince Georgy Lvov was chosen as the head 
of the Delegation. They formed their position on November 7, 1918, which 
deviated from the traditional Russian imperial concept on one point: they 
were willing to give up Poland, but they were unwilling to relinquish any 
other territories of the Russian state. Moreover, they counted on Galicia, 
Bukovina and Ruthenia34 being annexed to Russia. Nor did the Russians wish 
to recognize the independence of the Baltic states and they wanted to ensure 
passage for Russia to the Black and Caspian seas.35 The ambitions of the 
Russian anti-revolutionary forces waging war against the Bolsheviks were, 
therefore, (particularly considering their capabilities at that point) greatly 
exaggerated. Following a period of some thought on January 12, 1919 the 
Allied Powers, on the suggestion of French Foreign Minister Pichon ended 
up deciding not to provide a seat for Russia amongst the victorious powers 
at the Peace Conference36. Nevertheless on January 16, 1919 at a meeting 
of the Council of Ten Lloyd George did raise the question as to what should 
be the relationship with Russia? He though it mad to think that Bolshevism 
could be brought down with military force. The Versailles Peace Conference 
33 Rossiyskaya Politicheskaya Delegatsiya.
34 Also known as Subcarpathia (Kárpátalja in Hungarian) and Sub Carpathian Rus. This territory, 
now better known as Ruthenia, been part of the Hungarian kingdom since its foundation in 
1000 until 1919. For a detailed history on the area see works by Robert Paul Magocsi from the 
University of Toronto. See http://dmorgan.web.wesleyan.edu/easteur/map1930.htm.
35 Serapionova confirms that the British were more supportive of the Baltic nations than of the 
Russians concerning the passages to the sea. See SERAPIONOVA, pp. 288–289.
36 Although they did offer Russia the option to express her position in memoranda. Ibidem, 
pp. 286–287.
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was opened two days later on January 18, 1919.37 The British Prime Minister 
thought it important to obtain information on the true balance of power and 
the situation with regard to the Russians. His only remark was that it was 
to be stipulated that Lithuania and Poland be evacuated. According to Lloyd 
George to harbor hopes in Denikin, Kolchak and in the Czechoslovak army 
was like “building a sandcastle”. The ensuing reaction was interesting and 
France, for instance, strongly objected to the proposal by the British Prime 
Minister. Therefore the debate was postponed until January 21, 1919 at which 
time the possibility of a more serious intervention was again brought up. This 
possibility had been rejected earlier by Lloyd George, nor was it supported by 
the American president. Lloyd George felt it worth organizing the defense of 
various independent nations, referring to Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia 
and Finland. In the meantime the Bolsheviks had taken control not only of the 
capital of the country, but also of the central territories of Russia.38
Finally Woodrow Wilson proposed a congress for all powers having 
formed within the territory of the Russian Empire. He suggested inviting 
them to the islands of Thessaloniki or Limnos and, moreover, to invite not 
only the Russian anti-revolutionary forces but also the Bolsheviks and the 
various independent national governments, a proposal which Clemenceau 
strongly opposed.39 The next day, on January 22, 1919 the American president 
proposed Princes’ Islands at Istanbul’s entrance to the Sea of Marmara as 
the site of the congress, and the proposal was then sent to all the various 
organizations.40
37 In contrast to the Vienna Conference held one hundred years previously, here right from 
the outset the conquered powers were not allowed to participate: notes Henry Kissinger in his 
tome on the history of diplomacy. KISSINGER, p. 227.
38 Luckily for the Bolsheviks, there were serious conflicts also amongst the various anti-
revolutionary groups, which in turn reinforced Lenin. General Alekseyev wrote to his Russian 
representative to England in the summer of 1918 that he would rather cooperative with Lenin 
and Trotsky than with Savinkov and Kerensky. See HELLER – NYEKRICS, p. 67.
39 Clemenceau stated his concern with regard to the spread of Bolshevism throughout Europe. 
Sonino Italian Foreign Minister would have sent only volunteers as interventionists to Russia. 
http://www.diphis.ru/princevi_ostrova-a496.html.
40 On January 24 of 1919 a radio announcement was made to all organizations within the 
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Wilson’s suggestion was to invite, based on his Fourteen Points, three 
representatives for preliminary consultation from all the organized groups from 
the territory of the Russian Empire with political or military power, other than 
Finland and Poland. Conflict amongst the groups was to be suspended for the 
duration of the meetings. The congress would have been convened in the interest 
of forming a common position. Princes’ Islands were chosen as the site because 
the Allied Powers had entered the area following November 1918, and it was 
close to all Russian territories and therefore the delegates would have been able 
to access it relatively easily. The costs would have been covered by the Allied 
Powers and the planned date was set for February 15, 1919.
The offer to convene on Princes’ Islands was extended to the 
representatives of the Baltic and the Caucasian states, in addition to the 
Bolsheviks and the whites.41
On February 2, 1919 Maklakov wired to Omsk that the recognition 
of Finland was a fait accompli. Regarding Bessarabia the Romanians are 
“plotting”, he wrote, while the Poles are planning to form a federation with 
Lithuania and are making claims for a part of Belorussia, as well as for Eastern 
Galicia. On the same day Kolchak and his circle sent a cable via Foreign 
Minister Vologodsky that “the enemies of civilization (the Bolsheviks) are 
going to fight “to the bitter end”. “On Princes’ Islands they will be willing 
only to condemn Bolshevism and to enter into no other sort of negotiations.” 
Omsk sent a similar reply on February 5, 1919.
The French, counting on the success of their own expedition forces and 
on that of the whites, intimated to the Russians that they should reject the 
invitation. In spite of this Odessa sent a detailed list on February 3, 1919, 
in which they left out the local Bolsheviks. Maklakov sent a supplementary 
explanation on February 26, 1919 in which he called attention to the fact that 
the invitation was not to parties but to “existing power structures” having 
governmental and military power.
territory of the Russian Empire. MAJOROS, Vereségtől a győzelemig, p. 188.
41 Why did the West not begin to fight Russia? See http://www.volk59.narod.ru/interpost.htm.
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From the Eastern Territory’s Provisional Government in Archangelsk the 
message was that they: “consider the armistice with the enemy to be detrimental, as 
the Bolsheviks respect neither international treaties nor international agreements.”
On the tenth of February Maklakov sensed that Washington’s position was 
becoming unfavorable towards the Russian White forces: “who are unable to 
liquidate Bolshevism on their own, and the reason for their dependence on foreign 
powers is the lack of support by the people.”42 Russian anti-revolutionary forces 
felt Wilson’s proposal to be “a stab in the back” and to be “another Brest”.
On the part of the Soviet of People’s Commissars G.V. Chicherin, 
Commissar of Foreign Policy sent a wire on February 4, 1919 in which the 
Soviets declared they were ready to pay installments on the debts of Tsarist 
Russia and of the Provisional Government. The Russian Political Advisory 
Council in Paris reacted to the proposal on February 16, 1919, i.e. after 
the planned date of the congress. They stated that no sort of armistice was 
conceivable between the national forces and the Bolsheviks who “are able to 
remain in power only by means of terror” and rejected the proposal because 
the congress would have “decidedly detrimental results”. So whereas the 
Bolsheviks reacted diplomatically,43 the whites rejected the idea with outrage, 
and thus by March of 1919 the initiative, primarily due to the position of the 
latter, was defeated.44 The Supreme Council at its session on March 25, 1919 
was therefore forced to decide on whether or not to reinforce its Odessa base 
42 The “reactionary character” of the Don and Siberia on liberal politicians such as Wilson 
made doubtful the support of such white forces who were thinking along the lines of forming 
an authoritarian system and who wished to reinstate a Russia with an expansionist foreign 
policy. See S. LISTKOV, Russkoe politicheskoe soveshchanie i W. Wilson na Parizhskoi 
mirnoi konferentsii, in: http://www.perspektivy.info/history/russkoje_politicheskoje_
soveshhanije_i_v_vilson_na_parizhskoj_mirnoj_konferencii_2009-01-20.htm.
43 There was no mention of an armistice in the Bolsheviks’ reply. Furthermore, they stressed 
that nothing would be able to hold back the building of socialism in the Soviet Union. See 
http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Совещание_на_Принцевых_островах.
44 From amongst the Baltic nations the Estonians and the Latvians were hoping for international 
recognition of their nations from this event, while the Georgians for example referred to the 
fact that Russia was the topic at hand, with which they have nothing to do and therefore 
they don’t even wish to hear of the matter. N. A. NAROCHNITSKAYA, Rossiya i russkie v 
mirovoi istorii, Moscow 2004, p. 232.
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or to shut it down. It decided on the latter option and with this the fate of the 
planned great intervention was sealed. It was not to happen.45
The Soviet government recognized the sovereign rights of the nationalities. 
Theoretically this included the possibility of independence, i.e. the right to secede 
from the Soviet State. Joseph Stalin, who was later to become the People’s Commissar 
for Nationalities Affairs, was the first to formulate this right, with the aid of Bukharin, 
in 1913 in his article entitled “Marxism and the National Question”. The Soviet 
leadership proceeded in this spirit when on November 15, 1917 it proclaimed the 
right to collective sovereignty in its decree on “The rights of peoples”. In January of 
1918 the Finns declared their sovereignty and were followed in this by the Poles and 
the Baltic peoples of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.46
The Communist Party’s position rejecting traditional Russian imperial policy 
was seemingly consistent in these years. Nonetheless with regard to the right of 
sovereignty of peoples one cannot overlook the fact that the Party made concessions 
only in matters of the nationalities on the periphery, and even then not always.
Lenin’s Bolshevik general staff was not overjoyed at the proclamation 
of the Hungarian Republic of Councils on March 21, 1919 as it had been 
counting on not only revolutionizing the territories of the former Monarchy, 
but also Germany as well. It was in the days just before the Hungarian Republic 
of Councils was proclaimed that the First Communist International had been 
established for the purpose of organizing world revolution.47
Summary
The Comintern, as the Third International was referred to, declaredly took as 
its point of departure that in the time of communist revolutions “the liberation 
of the peoples must be achieved”.48
45 MAJOROS – ORMOS, pp. 256–257.
46 A commonality amongst them was that they were all close to Europe, and the European 
influence prevailed in their territories. KOHN, p. 279.
47 A Kommunista Internacionálé válogatott dokumentumai, Budapest 1975, pp. 13–20, as well 
as 1920 party rules ibidem, pp. 53–57.
48 The founding congress (March 2–6, 1919) minutes ibidem, p. 14.
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In the period at issue, although their ambitions were global, in reality 
even though the foreign policy of the Bolsheviks was based to a significant 
degree on the rejection of Pan-Slavism, it also remained European centered. 
Their position was not free from contradiction, as although they were mainly 
counting on revolutionizing the wartime enemy of Germany, at the same 
time they practiced realpolitik. The need to consolidate the state power of the 
Bolsheviks simultaneously required that they forsake not only the Russian 
objectives of the war: i.e. those of procuring the straights to the sea and gaining 
Constantinople, Ruthenia, Galicia and Bukovina, but also that they relinquish 
such territories of the Russian Empire the dis-annexation of which was seen 
by the majority of the Russians to be unnatural: i.e. Ukraine, Bessarabia, and 
the Caucasian nations, although it is conceivable that the independence of 
Finland, Poland and even the Baltic states could have been digested.
The Russian national rightwing program was not free from contradiction 
either. It outlined an uncompromising annexation program in both the Central 
European region and also in the region of the Bosporus. By mid-1917, 
however, it was evident that it would be unable to realize this program alone, 
and by July 1917 politically both the Kadets and the Octobrists were removed 
from the Provisional Government due to the intolerance by Russian society 
of these factions’ own expansionist policies. For them remained the blind 
belief in the victory of the Allied Powers, while only socialist parties: the 
Social Revolutionaries, the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks were ruling at the 
center in the Provisional Government. The Kadets and the Octobrists began to 
organize in the marginal territories, but in addition to the fact that they were 
unable to count on the support of the nationalities making up more than half of 
the Empire, they could not recover the support of the majority of the Russian 
population either. The fall in production further exacerbated the situation. The 
lack of any gains from the war increased the popularity of Bolsheviks who 
had been promoting a foreign policy nihilistic from the outset, which led to 
Lenin and his circle being able to solidify their power following the revolution 
of October 1917. The program of relinquishing traditional expansion and 
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breaking with the former foreign policy objectives seemed to be the lesser 
destructive of two evils. Thus unfolds the tale of gradual failure of Russian 
Pan-Slavism pushing European expansionism in the period between the 
assassination at Sarajevo and the planned congress at Princes’ Islands. In the 
course of these events the Tsar and his circle were confronted with the scope 
of the fiasco although, perhaps due to the particular Russian governmental 
structure, mainly the traditional civil parties of the Duma were not. While 
the Tsar and his supporters were almost immediately ejected from the power 
structure, the Octobrist and Kadet members of the Duma left only a half year 
later and due to a number of major foreign policy blunders they drifted to the 
periphery. The greater part of the Social Revolutionary Party was expelled 
by the open dictatorship of the Bolsheviks, definitively in January 1918. The 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was, from a Bolshevik viewpoint, not about foreign 
policy goals but about survival and which the Bolsheviks repealed as soon 
as they were able to. As the burdens of the war were born by Russia and thus 
she contributed to the defeat of Germany to a significant degree, it would 
have been morally justified for Russia to participate at the Versailles Peace 
Conference. (From a political power perspective, just as for all the defeated 
nations who were not allowed to participate either, consequently for Germany 
as well). These, mainly Anglo-Saxon initiatives in January and February of 
1919 did attempt one thing, but a compromise, and thus participation at the 
Peace Conference, was made impossible by the enmity by all parties towards 
each other. The Bolsheviks were the ones to sense the divisiveness of the 
Great Powers when they reacted to the invitation to the Princes’ Islands, as the 
“carrot” held out of payment of the debts incurred by the Tsarist governments 
and the Provisional government was designed for the French. The French, 
however, played deaf to the proposal as they were hoping for the collapse 
of the system. Therefore the peace treaty to be concluded with the Russians 
failed due to the opposition of the various Russian anti-revolutionary centers, 
to the civil war taking place on the territory of Russia, and in part due to the 
resistance by the French as well.
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It seems in any case to be certain that the various political groups 
endeavored consistently to realize their own objectives. The question, however, 
remains: to what degree that did what occurred in Russia come about due to 
lack of inexperience with power, simple stupidity or to the unnatural degree of 
reliance on foreign allies?
Abstract
Russian expansionism in Europe during World War I – despite the temporary 
victories - by the end of 1916 concluded to an occasional and by the spring 
of 1918 a decisive defeat. Tsar Nicholas II was the first who was willing to 
take steps towards peace that led to the fiasco of Tsarism which was the most 
influential cause of the Russian Revolution and foundation of the Russian 
Republic by the end of February in 1917. The new Russian Provisional 
government had been emphasizing the goal of the final victory continuously, 
which led to the victory of the anti-expansionist Bolshevik movement. Lenin’s 
followers had signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany, Austro-
Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria at the spring of 1918, but after the 
defeat of the Central Powers in the autumn of 1918 the Bolshevik government 
declared it null and void in all respects. The Allied Powers originally counted 
on the participation of Russia at the peace talks in Versailles, but by January 
1918 they changed their mind. At the same time they had made steps to 
bring about a joint Russian position, so they invited all the Russian political 
movements and parties to Princes Islands nearby Constantinople. Nevertheless, 
the Russians were not able to form a common standpoint, partly because they 
were conflicting amongst themselves, on the one hand, and partly because 
their expansionist programs were contradictional to each other and were not 
based on a real strong and functioning military power.
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